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I.

Introduction
For almost forty years, non-reciprocal preference schemes have sought to promote industrialization, increase exports and foster growth in developing countries. 1 Numerous studies have evaluated nonpreferential schemes, showing mixed results. 2 The bulk of evidence seems to suggest that while certain countries have benefited from non-reciprocal preferences to a significant degree, others have not. One factor explaining attenuated benefits from preferences is limited supply response capacity in the beneficiary countries. Other factors are intrinsic to the preference schemes themselves. These include product exclusions where export potential exists, country exclusions on a variety of economic and non-economic grounds, restrictive rules of origin that require higher than existing levels of manufacturing activity in preference-receiving countries, and administrative costs incurred in gaining access to the schemes.
These limitations clearly do not debilitate current preference schemes to such a degree that beneficiaries view the potential erosion of preference margins in the Doha negotiations with equanimity. On the contrary, in both the negotiations on agriculture and non-agricultural market access (NAMA), we have witnessed a concerted effort to ensure that preference erosion is addressed. "particular needs that may arise for the Members concerned due to the challenges that may be faced by non-reciprocal preference beneficiary Members." Broadly speaking, four different approaches have been proposed. One of them is to extend existing preference schemes. 4 Another is to improve the scope for utilizing existing preferences. A third approach is to mitigate the product coverage or pace of MFN liberalization, 5 and a fourth calls for compensatory action. 6 In agriculture, much the same 1 See Resolution 21(ii) of UNCTAD II (1968) for the rationale of preferences. 2 For instance, Murray (1977) , Borrman, Borrmann and Steger (1981) , OECD (1983) , Sapir and Lundberg (1984) , Karsenty and Laird (1986) , Brown (1987) , Brown (1989) , UNCTAD (1999) , Ozden and Reinhardt (2003) , OECD (2003) , WTO (2004) , Grossman and Sykes (2005 4 An example of this approach is the submission by Bangladesh on behalf of the least-developed countries (LDCs), TN/MA/W/22 of 8 January, 2003. This submission calls for improvements in existing preference schemes so as to ensure duty-free and quota-free access for all LDC exports and also proposes that other developing countries develop non-preferential preference schemes. 5 Mauritius, for example, proposes maintaining MFN tariffs above certain levels on a limited range of products (TN/MA/W/21/Add. 1, 15 July, 2003) . Papua New Guinea suggests that MFN tariff reductions on goods of "vital importance" be implemented over twice the length of time decided for all other products and that implementation of reductions on the former group of products only commence after three years (TN/MA/W/39, 2 July, 2003) . A submission by Benin on behalf of the ACP States develops a vulnerability index to determine level data, we establish "theoretical maxima" estimates of preference erosion. The theoretical maximum is taken to be the trade weighted difference between MFN duties and preferential duties.
This estimate is then subject to an adjustment factor. The adjustment recognizes that from the point of view of a non-reciprocal preference beneficiary, competing trade from other preference receiversof both non-reciprocal and reciprocal preferences -does not face MFN tariff rates. When this competition from other geographical sources is taken into account, including from exporters that have regional trade agreements with preference-giving countries, it is apparent that risks from preference erosion are lower than if the relevant comparison is made simply in respect of MFN trade. We would have liked to apply a second adjustment factor relating to preference utilization for the QUAD plus Australia market. Unfortunately we were unable to obtain sufficient data to make this adjustment except in the case of the United States. Where non-reciprocal preferences have not been fully utilized for one reason or another, an exporter is effectively at less risk from preference erosion as a consequence of MFN liberalization. In order to focus on the value of non-reciprocal preferences, estimates are reported only for those developing countries that receive non-reciprocal preferences from at least one of the QUAD countries or Australia. In other words, developing countries involved in reciprocal preferential trading arrangements with these countries in 2003 are excluded.
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After providing these base-line estimates of adjusted risk from preference erosion, we make a simple simulation of a non-linear MFN tariff cut in order to provide a sense of what such a scenario of MFN liberalization would mean by way of preference erosion among recipients of non-reciprocal preferences (Section V). We only simulate a tariff cut in NAMA, on the grounds that we do not possess enough knowledge about possible tariff-cutting formulae in agriculture. Our simulation is for a Swiss formula cut with a coefficient of 10 for the Quad (United States, EU, Japan and Canada) plus
Australia. This exercise is strictly illustrative and the choice of a particular MFN reduction scenario does not claim to bear any relation to what may eventually be decided, nor does it imply any judgement on our part as to the desirable outcome of the NAMA negotiations. Moreover, we do not apply any simulation techniques in order to estimate the possible trade or welfare outcomes arising from MFN liberalization and the resulting erosion of preferences. On the basis of our simplified calculations, we provide an indication of which countries and which product categories in those countries are seemingly the most vulnerable to preference erosion.
Section VI of the paper considers trade policy actions that could ameliorate preference erosion. It contains three subsections, each dealing with a particular facet of possible solutions. The first of these 9 For the developing countries that benefit from both reciprocal and non-reciprocal preference we cannot distinguish between the impact of MFN liberalization on the erosion of reciprocal preferences and that on the erosion of non-reciprocal preferences. These excluded countries are: Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Morocco, Mexico, Former Republic of Macedonia, Croatia, Jordan, Chile, South Africa, Israel, Tunisia, Costa Rica, Singapore, Fiji and Papua New Guinea.
is concerned with how far improvements in preference utilization rates could help in lessening the impact of preference erosion from MFN liberalization. This discussion is severely hampered by the paucity of comprehensive data on utilization rates. The second subsection considers the scope that may exist for softening the consequences of preference erosion through the extension of the coverage of non-reciprocal preferential trade arrangements. This analysis is conducted in relation to the Quad plus Australia, the importers that have been analyzed as preference-givers in the rest of the paper. The third subsection considers briefly the extent to which the effects of preference erosion may be mitigated through the development of preference arrangements by importers other than the Quad plus Australia. Most of the analysis in Section VI refers back to the base data in Section IV and the simulation in Section V. Section VII concludes.
Two observations about the limitations of the analysis are in order. First, we have not attempted to simulate the possible effects of changes in relative prices (from MFN liberalization) on supply and demand. This could obviously be done with a general equilibrium model or with a partial equilibrium elasticity analysis, but we limit ourselves at this stage to a simple comparison of what happens to the estimated value of preferences at the country level when MFN tariff rates are cut, with everything else staying the same. Second, because the estimates for this paper are all built on existing trade flows, we have no way of knowing whether a reduction in preference margins might be compensated by trade in product lines against which zero trade has been recorded in our data set.
II. Some theoretical considerations
This Section describes the consequences for preference receivers and third parties of a change in a preference margin. 10 It explains what determines the value of a preference from the point of view of preference receivers and their ability to benefit from preferences. In particular, the discussion draws distinctions between the concept of preference erosion and the welfare consequences of a change in a preference margin.
a) The effects of a preferential tariff
When exporters in one country are granted preferential trade treatment they may export more to the preference-giving country than they could have under MFN tariffs. Trade preferences may improve market access and stimulate diversification toward a broader range of exports. In the longer term, 10 We do not examine the implications of preferences from the perspective of preference-giving countries.
enhanced market access may foster export-driven economic development. advantage. Preferences may entail administrative burdens associated with origin requirements. The rules of origin may also require that inputs are sourced from higher cost suppliers (Krueger, 1993; Krishna and Krueger, 1995) . Moreover, preferences are sometimes linked to the adoption of labour and intellectual property standards that can be costly (Bhagwati, 2002) . In the longer term, preferences may create a disincentive for trade liberalization (Ozden and Reinhardt, 2002 ).
Let us turn briefly to the basic analytics of tariff preferences. The simplest framework for this purpose is a partial equilibrium model of three countries and one traded good. One country (country A) grants a preference on a given imported product, one developing country benefits from the preference (country B) and another country or the rest of the world (W) faces the MFN tariff rate. In the first instance we assume that irrespective of any changes in the demand for imports in A, the rest of the world supplies the good at a fixed price, 13 while country B supplies more of the good at higher prices.
Suppose a situation where W is the most efficient producer of the product in question, while country A is less efficient. Suppose also that with no preference, country A imports from both B and W at a fixed price. The introduction of the preference shifts relative prices in favour of the good produced in country B. The demand for imports in country A will shift from W to country B. The preference constitutes a transfer from country A (through tariff revenue losses) and W (through loss of exports)
to country B.
The diversion of imports in country A from the globally most efficient producers (W) to imports from country B (less efficient) induces a negative allocative efficiency effect. In country B, the price received by exporters will increase by the preference margin (the difference between the MFN and the preferential rate) and, as a consequence, the supply of exports will increase. The extent to which exports increase will depend on the responsiveness of country B's export supply to the price change (export supply elasticity). The higher this elasticity, the larger the trade effects will be and therefore the larger the gains.
11 See, for example, the experience of Mauritius in Subramanian and Roy (2002) . 12 For a review of relevant literature see Langhammer and Sapir (1987) and Tangermann (2002) .
Let us now turn to the impact of a preference on non-beneficiary countries (W). Because of the preferential treatment of imports from country B, W's exports to country A will become relatively more expensive. Demand for W's production will decrease and their exports will be replaced by country A's imports from country B. Producers in W will lose.
It is important to highlight that these effects depend on a number of assumptions, such as that the preference-receiving country is not the most efficient producer of the good for which a preference is provided and that the initial MFN rate is not prohibitive. If a preference to a developing country falls on a good that the latter country can export efficiently once the import barrier is reduced, and a new market is thereby opened up to trade (where tariff barriers, for example, were previously prohibitive), no trade diversion from the rest of the world would occur.
To sum up, on the basis of the simplest analytical framework, preferences result in a transfer from the producers of the preferred good and the government in the country granting the preference to the producers in the preference receiving country. Preferences might also divert trade from nonbeneficiary countries, thus lowering non-beneficiary countries' welfare. However, if preferences open up a new market or the beneficiary country is globally efficient, non-beneficiary countries will not necessarily suffer a welfare loss.
b) Does preference erosion imply welfare losses for the beneficiary countries ?
So far, we have looked at what happens when a country introduces a preference, both from the point of view of the beneficiary country and of other countries supplying the preference-giving country.
Now we consider a situation in which a preference margin is eroded, either through a modification of the preferential conditions of access or as a result of MFN liberalization. Using the same simple framework as above, the erosion of country B's preference margin will reduce B's competitive advantage, leading to reduced exports to Country A and lower welfare for exporters in country B. At the same time those countries (W) that did not receive the preference but are more efficient than Country B are better off, since they gain market in Country A. The trade-diverting effect of Country B's preference in Country A will be reduced.
On the basis of this simple analysis it might seem appropriate to associate preference erosion directly with a welfare loss, as there is a clear relationship between the two -the greater the erosion of preferences, the larger the welfare losses for exporters in beneficiary countries. However, this is only 13 Infinitely elastic export supply from the rest of the world one of the possible outcomes of preference erosion. Various alternative outcomes arise when the issue of preference erosion is analysed in the context of more complex economic frameworks. An alternative plausible situation is one in which following MFN liberalization, domestic prices in country A go down by less than the reduction of the MFN tariff, implying a smaller loss for Country B or even a gain. 14 A possible reason for this is that the increase in the demand for the good in country A is so large that the world price of the good increases. 15 Another possible reason might be that imperfect competition amongst importing firms in A may impede a full price transmission of a fall in the tariff.
It is possible to think of situations where preference erosion arising from MFN liberalization does not lead to negative welfare consequences for preference receiving counties, even abstracting from termsof-trade effects. The simplest case is one where exports of a given product from a preference receiving country to a preference giving country occur both at the preferential and the MFN rate.
Suppose, for example, that different exporters of the same product face different costs in actually utilizing a preference. Since producers use different technologies, it may be convenient for some to use the preference and satisfy the requirements, while the origin rules may make it less convenient for others. 16 In this situation the reduction of the MFN rate will benefit those exporters subject to the MFN rate. These benefits may outweigh the losses of those who receive the preference. It can be argued that the lower the share of preferential trade in relation to MFN trade in a product, the more likely it is that overall, exporters gain from MFN liberalization notwithstanding the erosion of their preferences. The trade-off between gains from MFN and losses from preference erosion will also depend on whether something can be done to make it easier to take advantage of preferences (e.g. modified rules of origin).
To sum up, although preference erosion in general is associated with a welfare loss, it is worth stressing that there may not be a monotonic relationship between changes in preference margins and welfare effects in beneficiary countries. The assessment of the welfare implications of MFN liberalization on preference receiving countries following the erosion of preference margins is not 14 It is possible that although Country B's preference margin declines following MFN liberalization, the price received by exporters in country B still rises, and exports and welfare increase. The likelihood of this happening depends on the original margin of preference and on the responsiveness of export supply and import demand. In particular, the price received by the preferred exporter will be higher the higher the responsiveness of demand for imports in country A to a variation of domestic prices (import demand elasticity) and the lower the responsiveness of the export supply from the rest of the world to export price variations. 15 This can be the case when A is a "large" country. Also, in terms of the analytical framework, the assumption of a perfectly elastic supply curve from the rest of the world needs to be relaxed. Rather than a flat supply curve the supply curve from the rest of the world would be, in this case, positively sloped. 16 The theoretical model for this is one with heterogeneous firms, like in Melitz (2003) .
always straightforward, including when looking at one single market. 17 For example, preference erosion may not imply welfare losses for the preference receiving country if the country benefit of large positive terms-of-trade effects or if exporters were, to a large extent, not using the preferences.
III. Preference margin: which measure?
In this section we discuss the limitations of the traditional measures for the value of preferences. Then we describe the measures of preference erosion used in this paper and provide the rationale for them.
Finally, we alert the reader to certain interpretation issues in relation to the data on preference erosion.
(a) Traditional measures of the value of the preference
Theory shows that in the simplest framework there is a direct link between the extent of a preference and the potential gains for a beneficiary country. Therefore, as a first approximation, the value of the preference for the preference receiving country is often measured by the preference margin. At the tariff line, this is simply the difference in percentage points between the MFN and the preferential tariff rate.
The preference margin has a number of limitations as a measure of the value of a preference. One is that it ignores the question whether the advantage given to the preference receiving country effectively helps the latter to export to the preference giving country. For example, if the MFN rate is set at a prohibitive level, a comparably high margin of preference may not be sufficient to allow any trade in that sector. Similarly, preferences given in sectors where the receiving country is very inefficient may not be sufficient to trigger exports. In addition, tariff rate quotas may significantly limit the actual preference margin, as preferences are limited to a certain quantity of exports while the calculation of the preference margin or preference erosion refers to the beneficiary country's overall exports.
In order to account for bilateral trade, we calculate the trade-weighted value of the preference margin as the value of the preference. This is defined as the preference margin per unit of imports multiplied by the bilateral import value.
This measure of the value of the preference still neglects two important issues. First, it is based on the assumption that MFN rates are applied to the trade of all other countries supplying the same market.
In reality, numerous and overlapping regional trade agreements exist around the world, so the MFN 17 The assessment of the welfare impact of the preference erosion becomes even more complex when other markets are taken into account. For example, preference erosion in one market may prove to be positive for the rate does not provide an appropriate basis for calculating the preference margin. Moreover, the value of a preference to one country will in practice depend on how many other countries are competing in the same market with a preferential margin. For example, Ozden and Sharma (2004) show that apparel producers from the Caribbean Basin Initiative countries received less benefit in the US market after NAFTA was formed because of competition from Mexico.
Second, the weighted preference margin is also based on the assumption that preferences are utilized for all exports, while in practice the utilization rates vary significantly both across countries and sectors. Utilization rates, defined as the ratio between imports actually receiving a preference and imports covered by the preferential agreement, can be significantly less than 100 per cent.
(b) Adjusted measures of the value of the preference
In this paper, we adjust the value of the preference margin for the de facto erosion of preferences due to the existence of other exporters benefiting from the same preferential scheme and other nonreciprocal and reciprocal preferences. A "corrected" preference margin is calculated as the percentage point difference between the weighted average tariff rate applied to the rest of the world and the preferential rate applied to the beneficiary country, where weights are represented by trade shares in the preference granting market (hereafter, we will refer to this measure as the competition-adjusted preference margin). The idea for this adjustment follows from the result of Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) , which emphasizes that bilateral imports depend on bilateral barriers to trade relative to the rest of the world. A second measure adjusts the preference margin for the rate of preference utilization (the utilization-adjusted preference margin). That is, the preference margin is weighted by the volume of trade that actually benefits from the preference. We could only make this calculation for the United States because of data deficiencies.
The computation of our adjusted measures of the value of the preference requires information about MFN and preferential rates and the volume of trade by type of market access. For example, assume that the tariff profile and trade pattern of a country, Country A, is that portrayed in Table 1 . Country A provides preferential access to Country B, but also has in place a number of other preferential agreements with countries in the rest of the world. Country B's preference margin calculated as the simple difference between the MFN and the preferential rate would be 10-5=5. The competitionadjusted preference margin would instead be the (cross-country) trade-weighted average rate applied to the rest of the world and the preferential rate, that is 7.5-5=2.5. Moreover, if it is know that beneficiary country as a whole if preferences encouraged an inefficient allocation of resources by fostering specialization in sectors where the preference receiving country does not have a comparative advantage.
Country B utilizes its preference only for half of its trade with Country A, then the utilization weighted duty for Country B would be 7.5 and the actual preference margin would be equal to zero. Despite the adjustment, these estimates remain a very rough approximation of the actual value of a preference for the beneficiary country. One reason for this is that it cannot be safely assumed that the benefits of preferences accrue fully to the exporting country. The scarcity "rent" from preferences is usually shared in some measure by both exporters and importers. The distribution of the rent will depend on relative bargaining power in the market and on the strategic responses of third parties. The volume of trade and the preference margin do not provide information on the distribution of rents generated by tariff preferences. Actual gains from preferences enjoyed by exporters may be lessened if monopsonistic distributors are operating in the importing market, or if third parties not receiving preferences strategically cut their prices. 18 Ozden and Olarreaga (2005) find that African exporters of clothing to the United States under AGOA capture only one third of the available rent. Recent studies have also highlighted how rules of origin can play a significant role in the distribution of the rent from preferences. Cadot et al. (2005) argue, for example, that the preferential tariff is the price to be paid for Mexican assemblers to acquiesce to a rule of origin that forces them to buy US intermediate goods.
(c) Unresolved issues on the measure of preference erosion
Preference erosion is calculated as the difference of the value of the preference before and after MFN liberalization. In the analysis that follows we calculate preference erosion on the basis of both the unadjusted and the adjusted measure of preference erosion.
Despite being based on a more realistic measure of the value of the preference, certain limitations of these measures of preference erosion need to be taken into account when interpreting the results. One relates to the likelihood that a reduction in preference margin will also be reflected in a reduction in export volume. Since the common measure for preference erosion is calculated using a fixed value of exports, this may underestimate the real extent of erosion. Moreover, the analysis should not only be limited to existing suppliers -new entrants may appear in the market following MFN liberalization and affect the conditions of competition. Ideally, the quantification of potential preference erosion should be conducted in the context of a general equilibrium model that includes information at the tariff line level on the responsiveness of demand and supply to price variations (including all crossproduct linkages).
A second limitation relates to utilization rates. Even if utilization were taken into account, preference erosion is calculated assuming that utilization rates are unaffected by MFN liberalization. However, the erosion of the preference margin may affect an exporter's decision whether to utilize a preference.
Candau et al. (2004) find, for example, that the utilization of preferences in the European Union is
lower when the preference margin is low, which they interpret as evidence of significant compliance costs. This seems to suggest that a reduction of the preference margin following MFN liberalization might have a negative impact on the utilization rate, thus further increasing the extent of the preference erosion relative to that measured assuming no relationship between preferential margins and utilization.
A third limitation relates to the fact that in adjusting estimates of non-reciprocal preference margins by allowing for other preferential trade arrangements, it may be erroneously assumed that the latter preferences are fully utilized when this is not the case. Under regional free trade agreements (FTAs), for example, traders may not take advantage of the right to sell into a partner market duty free because of restrictions on rules of origin or high administrative costs involved in securing FTA treatment relative to the cost of paying the MFN tariff. This is exactly the same utilization issue that applies in the case of non-reciprocal preferential trade, and should be treated comparably in estimating the true value of preferences and risk from preference erosion.
IV. The value of non-reciprocal preferences: setting the scene
This section introduces the basic data used to calculate the value of non-reciprocal preferences, adjusted for non-MFN trade and in the case of the United States for less than full preference utilization. These data include information on the relative importance of preferential and nonpreferential trade, both from the point of view of the preference giver and beneficiary country. This makes it possible to set the scene for considering the scope for additional non-reciprocal preferences later in the paper. It also allows us to gauge how far potential preference erosion poses a threat to beneficiary countries, depending on the degree of MFN liberalization that occurs. A specific MFN liberalization scenario is developed in Section V.
The data presented in this section refer to selected country examples. Detailed information about all countries that benefit from non-reciprocal preferences only are reported in different sets of tabulations included as annexes to the paper. Information on data sources, the list of preferential schemes covered in data base and guidelines to Annex Tables are reported in the Appendix.
Preferential Schemes by providers
We first focus on the various non-reciprocal preferential schemes offered by the Quad (Canada, EU, shows that a much larger percentage of imports under the LDC schemes enter the preference-giving countries duty free. In the case of Australia, Canada and the EU, all imports entering under LDC preferences are duty free. In addition, Table A1 shows that nearly all imports entering under AGOA or ACP preferences, for example, for the US and EU, respectively, are duty free.
If one looks at the data in terms of possible trade solutions to preference erosion, this means that there is no margin of manoeuvre to compensate for the erosion of preferences by either introducing new preferences or reducing the preferential rate. A similar picture arises from tariff line information. Table 2 reports data on the percentage of tariff lines that either attract a positive MFN rate with no preferences or enjoy preferences but at a positive rate under both the GSP and the LDC schemes for each of the five preference-giving countries. In addition, for the EU and the US, the percentage of remaining tariff lines and the corresponding percentage of imports where there may be further scope to introduce preferences are reported for the ACP and the AGOA schemes respectively. Overall, the data show that the scope to extend preferences in order to compensate for preference erosion is very limited, especially under some schemes. Note: Other Schemes refer to the ACP scheme for the EU and the AGOA scheme for the US.
Importance of preferences by beneficiaries
We now look at preferences from the point of view of beneficiary countries. The importance of preferences for preference beneficiary countries and their vulnerability to preference erosion will depend on their dependence on preferences and the value of the preference.
In order to provide an overall picture of the importance of preferences for beneficiary countries, Table   3 reports overall percentages for developing countries and LDC exports by type of market access to the QUAD and Australia and the average value of preferences (measured both according to the traditional unadjusted measure of preference margins and the competition-adjusted measure 20 ). While developing countries enjoy a higher share of duty-free trade (52.1 per cent) than least developed countries (20.2 per cent), a much larger share of least-developed country trade benefits from preferences (61.2 per cent compared to 15.9 per cent for developing countries). The average preference margin for LDCs in the QUAD plus Australia drops from 6.4 to 1.6 when competition from other countries benefiting from preferences is taken into account. Moreover the equivalent preference margin for the developing countries that only benefit from non-reciprocal preferences as a whole is negative. This means that at least some developing countries face market conditions worse than their trade competitors. 21 As noted earlier, for data reasons, we cannot provide the figures for the utilization-adjusted preference margins except in the case of the United States.. The percentage of exports that enjoy preferences in the QUAD plus Australia markets (see Table A2 ,
) and preference margins (see Table A3 21 Recall that the adjustment for competition is made considering all competitors in the same markets, thus including countries that benefit from reciprocal preferences. 22 Table A2 in the annexes report data on the percentage of exports to the QUAD plus Australia that benefit from preferential access or MFN treatment by each individual exporting developing country (beneficiary of exclusively non-reciprocal preferences) or LDCs. In addition, Table A2 reports for the same set of countries data on how diversified their exports are (this is measured by the percentage of tariff lines on which they export). The figures for the value of the preferences, including the adjustment for competition, for each individual country are reported in Table A3 . Note that the overall figures for developing countries refer to all developing country members of WTO. 23 Individual data can be found in column [4] of Table A2 in the annexes.
It is interesting to note that nine of the ten countries named above whose preferential trade represents over 90 per cent of total exports (this only exclude Chad), also appear among the countries enjoying the highest preference margins from the QUAD plus Australia, whether adjusted for competition or not (see Table A3 , columns [7] and [1] respectively). In addition, these ten countries appear to have a very narrow export base (see Table A2 , columns [5]- [7] ). They export a range of products covering no more than 3 per cent of tariff lines. And some of them (e.g. Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique) hardly export at all at the MFN rate. If one considers a trade solution to preference erosion, the extent of coverage of preferences for the products exported by these countries, the large margin of preference, and the low degree of diversification of their exports (especially for those products not covered by preferences) seem to suggest that for these countries there is not much scope for a trade solution.
Estimates of the value of preferences are very sensitive to the specific measure used for the calculations. For example, Chart 4 shows the value of preferences for non-agricultural products exports to the US as estimated using four alternative measures: the simple weighted preference margin, the preference margin adjusted for the rate of utilization of the preferences, the margin adjusted for the preferences that the US grants to other countries, and an overall measure adjusting for both competition from other preference beneficiaries and the utilization rate. 24 It is interesting to note how for some countries, like the Philippines, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, preference margins turn out to be negative when adjusted for competition from other preference beneficiaries. Thus overall, these countries' exports benefit from less beneficial treatment than competing other countries in the US market.
24 Data for preference margin, adjusted and unadjusted are reported in Table A3 in the annexes. 
V. Simulating a MFN tariff cut in NAMA: what happens to preference margins?
In this section we simulate a MFN tariff cut on non-agricultural products and estimate the impact of this cut on the value of preferences. Preference erosion is calculated as the change in the value of the preference before and after the MFN cut. The simulations undertaken here only include estimates of preference margins adjusted for competing non-MFN trade and not for utilization rates. We have taken the Swiss formula with a coefficient of ten, and calculated the tariff cuts on 2003 MFN applied rates. It is to be noted that the base for cutting tariffs in the negotiations would be bound rates rather than applied rates. However, the three major reporters (excluding Australia), represent 90 per cent of imports, and there is little difference between their bound and applied rates. Therefore, it can be confidently assumed that the margin of error we introduced with this approximation is low.
As an example, Chart 5 shows the impact of MFN liberalization on the value of preferences for LDCs and for Lesotho and Nepal in particular. The comparison between the impact estimated on the basis of the traditional measure of preference erosion and our competition-adjusted measure shows that when competition arising from other preference receiving countries is taken into account, the estimated losses from preference erosion generally falls. In some countries (Nepal in the chart), the adjustment may even result in a gain from MFN liberalization as opposed to a loss in relation to a reduced preference margin. We then looked at preference erosion at the product level for these fifteen most vulnerable countries.
We identified some broad product categories (MTN categories) and calculated our "adjusted" preference erosion for these categories. The results of these calculations are reported in Table A5 in the annexes for each of the five preference giving countries. The table shows that in the five reporting markets, clothing is by far the largest part of the preference erosion story for the most affected countries. In fact, among nearly all reported countries the highest variation in the preference margin before and after the MFN cut is recorded for the clothing sector. Some countries also experience significant figures for preference erosion in other sectors, such as textiles, fish and fish products (especially Namibia, but also Mauritius and Madagascar), leather and leather products (especially Cambodia, but also Bangladesh), electrical machinery, and wood and wood products.
VI. Trade solutions to preference erosion a) Increased preference utilization
A number of studies have calculated preference utilization rates to assess the actual coverage of eligible products, the de facto exclusion of some potential beneficiary countries, and the access conditions in the markets of preference giving countries. Some studies suggest that non-reciprocal It has been argued, however, that measuring utilization rates for single preferential schemes to assess the importance of preferential access to certain markets may be misleading. This is because an exporter may have preferential access to a certain market via various preferential schemes. This is the case for preferential access to the EU market where, for example, sub-Saharan African countries benefit from preferential access to via the EBA initiative and the Cotonou agreement. When a broader measure of utilization is used, based on the utilization rate of "at least one" preferential agreement, figures on the overall use of preferences are much higher. Candau and Jean (2005) find that when all EU preference schemes are examined together, utilization rates are considerably better.
Bureau and Gallezot (2004) The basic questions we want to consider here are why utilization rates are less than 100 per cent and why they vary across sectors, countries and preferential regimes. Most studies point to rules of origin as the core explanation for all these questions. Rules of origin can impose additional production costs to exporters in developing countries that reduce the attraction of preferences or perhaps simply render them unusable. Additional production costs may be incurred by exporters as a result of an obligation to source inputs from high cost suppliers or to design production structures to comply with origin requirements. Documentation requirements such as certificates of origin and complex accounting systems may also add to costs.
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Because of the higher costs, restrictive rules of origin will affect the exporter decision about whether to utilize the preference or not. Clearly, if the cost of compliance 26 with rules of origin exceeds the margin of preference, the producer would choose not to use the preference. He will source inputs on the basis of profit considerations and export at the MFN rate. For example, Brenton and Manchin (2003) note that many exporters from Eastern European countries have preferred to continue exporting under OPT arrangements rather than exporting under the FTA, despite the lower tariffs, because of origin constraints. Similarly, it has been argued that the strong preference for the Cotonou regime over the EBA is due to more restrictive rules of origin for the latter.
Anson and Bacchetta show a clear inverse relationship between the restrictiveness of origin rules and utilization rates by LDCs in the textile and clothing sector. Some of the results of their study are reported in the table below. The data for Australia, Japan, Switzerland and Canada refer to the GSP regime for LDCs. For the United States and the EU, data are for AGOA and CBTPA and for Cotonou and EBA, respectively. Although based on qualitative information on rules of origin, the data suggest that utilization rates tend to be higher the lower the local content requirement, the less complex rules are (refer to the case of Japan for example) and the more liberal is the cumulation regime both in terms of country coverage and type of cumulation.
25 Recent studies that focus on NAFTA (Estevadeordal, 2000; Cadot et al. 2005) show that rules of origin effectively limit Mexico's duty free access to the United States and Canada. In particular, estimate total compliance costs for Mexican exporters at 6 per cent of the value of preferential exports, of which about one-third is due to administrative costs. 26 Carrère and de Melo (2004) show that compliance costs change among different rules of origin. They are lowest for a change in the tariff classification, somewhat higher for regional value content restrictions and highest for technical requirements. Focusing on Mexican exports to the United States, they find that in some circumstances preference margins of at least 10 per cent would be required to offset the cost-raising effect of a typical regional value content rule. exports from developing countries to developed countries take place at both the preferential and MFN rate, the reduction of the MFN rate will benefit the MFN rate exporters. This benefit may outweigh the loss to those who receive a preference. In other words, when the option of liberalizing rules of origin is not available, countries or sectors characterised by a low utilization rate may be better off pursuing a policy aimed at deepening MFN liberalization rather than preserving preference margins.
The data on utilization rates is scarce and it is difficult to draw a conclusion. Overall, available data appear to suggest that while there are undoubtedly areas and countries where low preference utilization occurs at least in part because of rules of origin limitations, for the most part underutilization of preferences is not a major factor. Therefore improvements in utilization offer only limited scope for mitigating preference erosion in the face of MFN liberalization.
b) Scope for extending non-reciprocal preferences in the five reporter countries (Quad plus
Australia)
As noted previously, an obvious trade solution to non-reciprocal preference erosion arising from MFN liberalization would be to extend preferential arrangements to other product areas where positive MFN rates apply. This paper has not reported the situation with respect to preferences at a detailed product or tariff line level, and cannot offer a precise indication of which products in which markets might lend themselves to new preferential arrangements. Table A4 in the annexes shows the aggregate value of trade by exporter in respect of which additional preferences could potentially be extended by preference receivers. Before looking more closely at these numbers it is important to recall a caveat made in Section I. Just as all the data in this paper are essentially static in nature, meaning that they take no account of possible supply and demand responses to changes in relative prices, the data are also built exclusively on actual trade performance -that is, the numbers reflect only existing and not potential trade patterns. Thus, when looking at the scope for extending preferences, we are only doing so in respect of products that countries have actually traded. There are doubtless other products that some exporters would be able to export under different tariff arrangements. Table A4 in the annexes by individual countries, that overall there is scope for compensation in 13 (of which 9 developing countries and 4 LDCs) countries out of 97 (of which 65 developing countries and 32 LDCs) countries for which simulations were run (see Table 5 below). 
c) Scope for compensating preference erosion through preferences in other markets
This paper has focused only on non-reciprocal preferential exports from developing countries to Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan and the United States (the five reporter countries). Although these markets represent a large share of the trade of many developing countries, a question arises as to whether part of a trade solution to preference erosion resulting from MFN liberalization might reside in extending preferential treatment in markets other than the five reporter countries. This question is not systematically addressed in the present paper. It should be noted, however, that all developed countries not covered here already have non-reciprocal preference schemes. These schemes would need to be studied in detail to determine the degree to which their value to developing countries would be lessened through MFN liberalization, and how far such losses were amenable to trade solutions. 
VII. Conclusions
This paper has taken a fairly detailed look at the likely dimensions of non-reciprocal preference erosion for developing countries arising from MFN trade liberalization. It has estimated the degree of preference erosion affecting all developing countries as a result of a MFN tariff cut on non-agricultural products. A similar exercise could have been undertaken for agricultural products but was not attempted in this study. The paper has also considered the extent to which "trade" solutions might be found for preference erosion through improving preference utilization rates and extending preferential arrangements to new products, either in the preference giving countries examined here or in other markets.
The main conclusions of the paper are summarized below. It should be noted that the conclusions are  A very significant part of the preference erosion story in the most affected countries is about clothing, especially in the case of the LDCs (except Madagascar). Other sectors of some interest to certain of the affected countries in the five reporter markets include textiles, fish and fish products, leather and leather products, electrical machinery, and wood and wood products.
 As far as trade solutions to preference erosion are concerned, it is unclear that improved utilization levels will make a decisive impact in most of the affected countries. There may, however, be one or two important exceptions. Some preliminary evidence suggests a positive effect can result from reforms of preferential schemes. More definitive conclusions are not possible because of an acute lack of comprehensive and reliable information. What information there is provides a mixed picture. While utilization problems seem to emerge in some reciprocal and non-reciprocal preference schemes, most developing and least-developed countries appear to enjoy reasonably high utilization rates (e.g. ACP countries into the EU and most countries into the United States). This issue requires additional research based on better information.
 Limited scope exists for expanding preference schemes to other product lines in the five reporter countries in order to ameliorate the impact of preference erosion on the most affected countries. This is because significant positive tariffs do not fall on non-preferential trade flows to the reporter countries. Four countries that are exceptions to this conclusion are notably Bangladesh and Cambodia, and less so Myanmar and Nepal.
 Limited scope also exists, at least in the near future, for softening the impact of preference erosion in the most affected countries through exports to markets other than those of the reporter countries. This is because the latter account for a very large share of the exports of the most affected countries.
A. Data Sources
The Tables   Table A1: Table A2 also provides statistics expressed in terms of tariff lines rather than import values using the same type of breakdowns. This information shows how narrow the export base is for many countries, especially the least-developed countries.
C. Guidelines on Annex
An important difference between Tables A1 and A2 is that in Table A2 the preference data refer to all non-MFN trade -that is, both non-reciprocal and reciprocal preferential trade, while Table A1 related to only specific non-reciprocal preference schemes. MFN applied rates. Note that the Swiss formula implies that the higher is that initial tariff (t 0 ), the higher will be the cut. All new tariffs (t 1 ) will be lower than 10. Table A4 show what MFN liberalization has done to the value of average preference margins before any adjustment is made for competing non-MFN trade. Columns [3]and [4] show the effects of the MFN cut with adjustments for competing MFN trade in the five reporter markets. Negative numbers, such as Namibia's $19.7 million shown in the first column as the amount by which Namibia would lose overall from preference erosion, is reduced to $10.7 million after adjustment. What this means is that Namibia suffers preference erosion to the value of some $10.7 million in the five reporter countries according to our simulations. Table A5 provides details by some broad product categories (MTN categories) in non agricultural products for selected countries, on the basis of the calculations of "adjusted" preference erosion. The imports share in terms of all imported products (agricultural and non agricultural) is first shown followed by the adjusted preferential margin before and after the cut using the same Swiss formula as for Table A4 . Weighted preference margins Adjusted weighted preference margin 
Columns [1] and [2] of
